BY_ CAMILLE TAWIL
FROM_ THE JAMESTOWN
JUN 1 2012
Abd al-Hakim
Belhadj, the former “Amir” of the now defunct Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
(LIFG), announced on May 15 that he is resigning from his post as head of
Tripoli’s Military Council in order to run in the June 19 election of Libya’s General
National Congress, the new constituent assembly (al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 16).
Belhadj will enter the political contest as a candidate of a newly-established
party known as al-Watan (“The Homeland”) (al-Jazeera, May 16). It has been
suggested that Belhadj may ultimately take a run at the post of president in
the new Libya (al-Youm, May 15).
Belhadj’s
decision is important as it shows that the jihadist leader is unafraid of
losing his grip on those parts of Tripoli that have been under the control of his
fighters since August 2011, when they advanced into the Libyan capital as the
regime of the late Colonel Mu’ammar Qaddafi was crumbling. It was the battle
for Bab al-Aziziya, Qaddafi’s residence in the heart of Tripoli, which made
Belhadj a famous “military leader”, as he was shown on TV screens leading his
men through the last bastion of the former regime in Tripoli accompanied by a
high ranking Qatari officer. [1]
However,
Belhadj’s fighters played only a small part in Tripoli’s fall as many other rebel
units were advancing on the Libyan capital from different directions at the
same time as Belhadj’s fighters were moving in. Since then these various rebel
factions have managed to partition Tripoli into a number of fiefdoms; each
controlled by a different militia. In addition to local rebel units from
Tripoli itself, these militias also included non-local groups such as those of
Misrata and Zintan.
The military
presence of these different militias in Tripoli plays a role in ensuring that
the weak interim government listens to their demands, often finding jobs for
their fighters and their families or relatives in government posts, as well as
receiving financial pay-outs given to those rebels who helped topple Qaddafi’s
regime. Whenever the government has shown reluctance to meet the fighters'
demands, the latter typically respond by flexing their military muscle on the
streets of the capital. More often than not, the government relents in the face
of these demonstrations of power. However, the government has recently shown
increasing stubbornness in meeting the rebels' demands. On May 8, clashes
erupted between guards protecting government offices in Tripoli and rebels who
came to protest over “unpaid stipends.”
These clashes came after the authorities, citing widespread fraud,
announced last month that they were halting the payment of cash bonuses to
rebels who had fought against Qaddafi's regime in 2011 (Telegraph, May 8).
The presence
of the different militias in Tripoli irritated not only the government, but
also many of the local residents, who have become fed up with the deadly
clashes erupting between the rebels units on almost on a weekly basis. Locals
have expressed their anger against the militias by organizing frequent protests
to demand their removal from Tripoli, most recently on May 12
(alwatan-libya.com, May 12).
Belhadj must
have realized that the presence of his fighters in Tripoli (based in the vast
military barracks near Tajoura, just east of the capital) may have become a
liability rather than an asset considering the changing attitude of the
government and the people of Tripoli. However, Belhadj must also be aware that
laying down his arms totally and moving into the political field carries with
it a certain risk in a country where arms ensure that demands are listened to
by authorities. It was noteworthy, then, that Belhadj announced that the
Military Council of Tripoli, which is controlled by jihadists personally loyal
to him, would not be disbanded after his official departure and would continue
to have a say in Tripoli’s affairs (al-Sharq al-Aswat, May 16).
It is
surprising that Belhadj has decided to run in the election as a candidate for
al-Watan, a political party that does not include former members of the LIFG.
Many former LIFG leaders appear to have decided to go their own way, without
Belhadj. A large portion of the LIFG leadership is now consolidated around a
new political entity, al-Umma al-Wasat (“The Middle Nation”), headed by Sami
al-Saadi (a.k.a. Abu al-Munthir), the former head of the LIFG’s religious
committee. Al-Saadi was rendered to Qaddafi’s regime from Hong Kong in the same
operation that led to Belhadj’s arrest in Thailand and his transfer to Tripoli
in 2004. Al-Saadi’s party seems to have attracted many important leaders of the
LIFG, including Idris Qaid, the older brother of Abu Yihya Alibi, a
high-ranking al-Qaeda leader based in Waziristan. [2] Although it is still too
early to make a final judgment, it appears as though al-Saadi’s party contains
a more religious-based element from the former-LIFG than Belhadj’s party, which
is still in the process of being formed.
It would be
fair, then, to assume that the jihadists will enter the coming Libyan elections
as a fragmented force, with at least two main political parties, al-Umma and
al-Watan. This situation resembles to a great extent what happened in
neighboring Egypt, where the former jihadists of al-Jama’a al-Islamiya (Islamic
Group) entered the parliamentary elections as part of two different political
parties. If the Egyptian example repeats itself in Libya next month, it is
likely that the results of the elections will indicate a limited support for
the Libyan jihadists, compared with that of the Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood) and
other Libyan political parties. In any case, the results of the Libyan
elections may shed some light as to where the jihadists have their main pool of
support in Libya. In the past, the Islamists' presence was largely confined to
the eastern regions, such as Benghazi and Derna, as well as in the south around
Sabha.
Whether or
not the jihadists make any big gains in the coming Libyan elections, it seems
clear that entering the political process is in itself an important step in
their transformation from a militant group to a political party. If they are
sincere in committing themselves to the decision of the Libyan electorate, this
will mark a major change from their past practices and religious beliefs, which
rejected democratic principles. This would also represent a significant challenge
to al-Qaeda's ideology of rejecting democracy and its insistence on carrying
out violent acts, even if these are aimed at Western interests.
Does the
decision of Belhadj, al-Saadi and other former LIFG leaders to enter politics
and end their militant activities have the support of the rest of the Libyan
jihadists? To answer this question one has to distinguish between at least
three types of jihadists:
Those who
could be described as the “old guard”; the leaders and members of the old LIFG.
The majority of these, including Belhadj and al-Saadi, seem to have taken a
clear decision to cut with the armed resistance of the past and join political
life.
There are
also those who could be termed the “new generation” of jihadists that came into
being after the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Many of these were too young
to remember the failed attempt of the LIFG’s “old guard” to topple Qaddafi in
the 1990s. These young jihadists do not believe they have any obligation to
follow the decisions of the LIFG leaders. This was made clear between 2006 and
2009 when some young imprisoned jihadists – the “Iraq generation” - reportedly
objected to the peace talks that were taking place between the imprisoned
leaders of the LIFG and the Qaddafi regime. One can assume that some of these
young jihadists may again object to the current policies of the former LIFG
leaders regarding political engagement. These jihadists may even be attracted
to involvement in what they see as a “jihadi cause,” as they did previously in
Iraq when they flocked there to join Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda branch in
the hope of fighting the American occupation. Syria today could become what
Iraq represented a few years ago to the Libyan jihadists. Syria is already
seeing more and more Arab jihadists – including Libyans - coming to assist the
revolt against al-Assad's regime.
There is
also a third kind of Libyan jihadists who belong to the old LIFG but now
consider themselves part of al-Qaeda, whether as part of the “Central Command”
in Waziristan or the local branch operating in North Africa, al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Some of these Libyan jihadists may be considered an
extension of the LIFG branch in Afghanistan which was led by the late Abu Laith
al-Libi and which merged with al-Qaeda in 2007.
The
challenge to Belhadj’s and al-Saadi’s decision to turn away from being an armed
group and turn into a political party will most likely come from members of
these last two categories of Libyan jihadists.
Camille
Tawil is an investigative journalist and Jamestown analyst who specializes in
Islamist groups and movements.
Notes:
1.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a8aWOD37I94&feature=related.
2. The first
statement issued by the Umma party, with pictures of its leaders at their first
meeting, can be found at the following link:
http://hanein.info/vb/showthread.php?t=280059.